\u3ci\u3eDonovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.\u3c/i\u3e: The Best Approach to Satisfying the Injury Requirement in Medical Monitoring Claims by Desai, Philip
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 1 Article 5
4-1-2011
Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.: The Best
Approach to Satisfying the Injury Requirement in
Medical Monitoring Claims
Philip Desai
DESAIPH@BC.EDU
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Philip Desai, Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.: The Best Approach to Satisfying the Injury Requirement in Medical Monitoring Claims, 38
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 95 (2011),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol38/iss1/5
 95 
DONOVAN v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.: THE 
BEST APPROACH TO SATISFYING THE 
INJURY REQUIREMENT IN MEDICAL 
MONITORING CLAIMS 
Philip Desai* 
Abstract: Medical monitoring claims seek money damages for the costs of 
medical testing required after toxic exposure. However, victims of toxic 
exposure often face challenges proving medical monitoring claims. Many 
courts require plaintiffs prove they have a present physical injury, and vic-
tims usually do not have any disease or illness attributable to the toxic ex-
posure when they bring medical monitoring claims. This Note argues that 
while a present physical injury should be required, a plaintiff that demon-
strates subcellular changes indicating toxic exposure and an increased 
risk of developing a disease sufficiently satisfies the present physical injury 
requirement. The best standard for addressing a medical monitoring 
claim was outlined in Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., a recent decision 
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
Introduction 
 Toxic torts involve harm from exposure to a hazardous substance.1 
Victims have brought toxic tort claims as a result of exposure to to-
bacco products, asbestos, Agent Orange, and other hazardous sub-
stances.2 Toxic tort victims have difficulty proving causation and injury 
in tort claims because injuries in toxic torts frequently do not manifest 
until years after exposure.3 In the interim, a victim of toxic exposure 
may be advised by a physician to undergo medical monitoring.4 Toxic 
tort victims have attempted to recover the cost of medical monitoring 
from the party responsible for the exposure.5 However, some courts 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2010–11. 
1 James Pizzirusso, Increased Risk, Fear of Disease and Medical Monitoring: Are Novel Damage 
Claims Enough to Overcome Causation Difficulties in Toxic Torts?, 7 Envtl. L. 183, 185 (2000). 
2 Id. 
3 Akim F. Czmus, Medical Monitoring of Toxic Torts, 13 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 35, 
35–36 (1994). 
4 See id. at 35 (introducing a hypothetical factual scenario in which a claim for medical 
monitoring may arise). 
5 See id. at 38–39; Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 203. 
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have declined to award damages for medical monitoring when plain-
tiffs are unable to show a present physical injury, forcing innocent vic-
tims of toxic exposure to pay for their own medical costs while waiting 
for symptoms of a disease to develop.6 
 Courts have split on the issue of whether medical monitoring 
claims are valid in the absence of a present physical injury.7 Opponents 
argue that a present physical injury is necessary to distinguish between 
legitimate and frivolous claims, and that allowing claims without such 
injury is an unnecessary departure from traditional notions of injury.8 
Supporters of medical monitoring claims in the absence of a present 
physical injury argue that it is consistent with tort principles to allow an 
innocent plaintiff to recover for the costs of medical monitoring from a 
negligent defendant.9 Courts allowing such claims cite the public 
health interest in diagnosing diseases early, the deterrent effect of 
awarding medical monitoring costs, the mitigation of the cost and se-
verity of future illnesses, and the inherent fairness of requiring the neg-
ligent party to pay for the medical monitoring costs of its victims.10 
 Recently, in Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts held that plaintiffs could proceed on a 
claim for medical monitoring in the absence of symptoms of any ill-
ness.11 However, the court formulated a test which required—among 
other elements—that plaintiffs show that the exposure caused, at a 
minimum, subcellular changes that increased the risk of disease.12 The 
court explained that this test addresses concerns of false claims.13 
 The Massachusetts approach presents the best standard for adjudi-
cating medical monitoring claims.14 The plaintiff should be required to 
                                                                                                                      
6 See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438–44 (1997) (declining 
to award medical monitoring damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act to a 
plaintiff who did not have symptoms of any disease); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 
684, 688 (Mich. 2005) (holding that a plaintiff bringing a claim for medical monitoring 
without establishing any present physical injury has failed to state a valid negligence 
claim); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 186 (Or. 2008) (holding that “the 
cost of medical monitoring . . . is not sufficient to give rise to a negligence claim” where 
the plaintiff has not alleged any physical harm). 
7 D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the 
Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 1095, 1097–98 (2006). 
8 See infra Part II.A. 
9 See infra Part II.B. 
10 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993).  
11 914 N.E.2d 891, 901–02 (Mass. 2009). 
12 Id. at 902. 
13 Id. at 901. 
14 See infra Part III.B. 
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prove a present physical injury.15 However, subcellular changes that es-
tablish exposure and an increased risk of disease necessitating medical 
monitoring should satisfy the physical injury requirement, even if such 
changes are not symptoms of any disease.16 The Donovan standard also 
requires a plaintiff to show that defendant’s negligence caused her ex-
posure, effective medical tests exist for the relevant disease, such tests 
followed by early diagnosis and treatment would significantly decrease 
the potential severity of disease, and such tests are reasonably neces-
sary.17 This standard is fair to both plaintiffs and defendants.18 Fur-
thermore, the standard is flexible enough to account for any future 
medical developments that provide more efficient methods for estab-
lishing exposure and causation.19 
 This Note argues that other courts should follow the Massachusetts 
approach by holding that plaintiffs who can establish subcellular 
changes satisfy the injury requirement for medical monitoring claims.20 
Part I introduces the difficulties inherent in toxic tort claims and out-
lines some novel claims brought by plaintiffs.21 Part II examines the le-
gal and policy arguments for and against medical monitoring claims 
absent physical injury, as explained by courts and commentators.22 Part 
III argues that plaintiffs who can show at least subcellular changes as a 
result of toxic exposure have satisfied the injury requirement, and con-
cludes that the Donovan test is the best model for adjudicating medical 
monitoring claims.23 
I. Toxic Torts 
 Tort law seeks to compensate people who are injured by the con-
duct of another.24 In order to bring a successful tort claim for negli-
gence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty to the 
victim, that the defendant’s conduct breached that duty, and that the 
                                                                                                                      
15 See infra Part III.A. 
16 See id. 
17 See Donovan, 914 N.E.2d at 902. 
18 See infra Part III.B.2–3. 
19 See infra Part III.B.2. 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part I. 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 1, at 6 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
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defendant’s conduct caused an actual injury to the plaintiff.25 The four 
elements for a successful tort claim are known as duty, breach, causa-
tion, and actual loss or damage.26 Causation and actual loss—injury— 
are two elements that create obstacles for toxic tort victims.27 Tort law is 
not concerned with negligent acts “where no actual loss has occurred.”28 
In other words, not all injuries meet the requisite level of harm to be 
actionable under tort law.29 Toxic torts are a specific type of tort, involv-
ing harm from exposure to a hazardous substance.30 Examples of toxic 
tort cases include claims against tobacco companies for causing lung 
cancer and claims brought by individuals exposed to asbestos.31 
A. Difficulties in Toxic Torts: Establishing Causation and Injury 
  Toxic tort victims often face obstacles in proving injury because 
victims of exposure frequently do not manifest any symptoms of physical 
injury until months or years after the exposure.32 Even if a victim of a 
toxic exposure experiences physical symptoms such as general malaise 
shortly after exposure, the victim may have an increased risk of cancer 
or other medical conditions and those symptoms will not manifest until 
months or years later.33 Furthermore, the possible effects of exposure to 
some hazardous substances are often unknown.34 Thus, establishing in-
jury after exposure becomes problematic for toxic tort victims.35 
 Victims also encounter problems with causation when attempting 
to prove that the disease is attributable to exposure that occurred years 
ago and not to some intervening cause.36 The loss of evidence during 
the years between exposure and illness adds to the difficulty of proving 
                                                                                                                      
25 Id. § 30, at 164–65. In addition to these requirements, plaintiffs may have to meet 
certain standing requirements. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992). For purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to identify that courts may not allow plain-
tiffs to proceed with a claim if the relief sought would not redress their injury. See id. 
26 Keeton et al., supra note 24, § 30, at 164–65. 
27 Czmus, supra note 3, at 35. 
28 Keeton et al., supra note 24, § 30, at 165. 
29 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1625, 
1651 (2002). 
30 Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 185. 
31 Id. 
32 See Czmus, supra note 3, at 35–36. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 37. 
35 Id. at 35. 
36 Janet H. Smith, Increasing Fear of Future Injury Claims: Where Speculation Carries the Day, 
64 Def. Couns. J. 547, 547–48 (1997). 
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causation.37 These problems arise in part because the nature of toxic 
exposure makes it difficult for the victim to determine the exact num-
ber and concentration of the toxins as well as the duration of expo-
sure.38 
 Causation in the toxic tort setting has two elements.39 First, a plain-
tiff must establish general causation by proving that the toxic substance 
is capable of producing the harm that plaintiff has suffered.40 Second, a 
plaintiff needs to establish specific causation by proving that toxic ex-
posure did in fact cause the plaintiff’s harm.41 General causation can be 
established by epidemiological studies that examine the association be-
tween exposure to a toxic substance and disease among a sample popu-
lation.42 However, most toxic substances have not been thoroughly test-
ed.43 Adding to the difficulty in proving general causation, many courts 
do not allow plaintiffs to use studies that relate a toxin to a specific dis-
ease to prove that the toxin can cause a related disease.44 Similarly, 
courts have often precluded plaintiffs from using evidence that relates 
a specific toxin to a disease to prove that a chemically related toxin can 
cause the same disease.45 Since general causation is usually a prerequi-
site to establishing individual causation, proving that a particular toxic 
substance is capable of causing the plaintiff’s harm is critical.46 
 After establishing general causation, a plaintiff must establish spe-
cific causation—usually through expert testimony of a physician—by 
proving that the exposure did in fact cause the plaintiff’s injury.47 How-
ever, proving specific causation is still very difficult, and the admissibility 
of such expert testimony is not universally accepted.48 Even after estab-
lishing general causation, a plaintiff will run into difficulties establishing 
specific causation because “the complex etiology of many diseases cre-
ates the possibility that any of a variety of factors could have caused the 
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. at 548. 
38 Czmus, supra note 3, at 37. 
39 Gary E. Marchant, Toxicogenomics and Toxic Torts, 20 Trends in Biotech. 329, 330 
(2002). 
40 Id.; Jon R. Pierce & Terrence Sexton, Toxicogenomics: Toward the Future of Toxic Tort 
Causation, 5 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 33, 34 (2003). 
41 Marchant, supra note 39, at 330; Pierce & Sexton, supra note 40, at 34. 
42 Pierce & Sexton, supra note 40, at 35. 
43 See Marchant, supra note 39, at 331. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Pierce & Sexton, supra note 40, at 35. 
47 See id. at 35–36. 
48 See id. at 36 n.19. 
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plaintiff’s injury” and that the disease was not necessarily caused by the 
exposure.49 
 There is a potential alternative method to prove general and spe-
cific causation in toxic torts.50 A field of science called toxicogenomics 
seeks to study “the cell-wide changes in gene expression following ex-
posure to toxins.”51 The techniques used in toxicogenomics aim to pro-
vide information about molecular changes that result from toxic expo-
sure.52 Since altered gene expression can occur instantaneously upon 
exposure, toxicogenomic data has the potential to provide much more 
useful evidence of exposure than the traditionally relied-upon evidence 
of clinical symptoms.53 Toxic substances can be categorized according 
to the physiological response—gene expression changes—that they 
produce.54 Doctors and lawyers could then simply look at an individ-
ual’s gene expression to confirm whether the individual was exposed to 
a certain toxic substance.55 However, “toxicogenomics is a relatively new 
[field of] science,”56 and there are still some uncertainties in toxicoge-
nomic data.57 One commentator has noted that while “[toxicogenomic 
data] could eventually serve as evidence to either establish or rebut the 
claim that exposure to a particular toxin caused the specific injury . . . 
the admissibility of toxicogenomic data in toxic tort litigation still is an 
open question.”58 
 The difficulties inherent in toxic tort litigation for victims of expo-
sure have caused some to argue that “traditional tort principles inade-
                                                                                                                      
49 See id. at 36. 
50 See generally Marchant, supra note 39, at 331 (describing the use of toxicogenomic 
data to prove general and specific causation). 
51 See id. at 329. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Pierce & Sexton, supra note 40, at 37 n.20. 
57 See Marchant, supra note 39, at 330 (describing difficulties in toxicogenomics, in-
cluding: quality control issues, false positives, and differentiating between adaptive re-
sponses in cells that have no toxicological significance and responses that actually repre-
sent disease progression). 
58 See Pierce & Sexton, supra note 40, at 56. This Note introduces the concept of toxi-
cogenomic data only to support the claim that defining injury to include subcellular 
changes that indicate an increased risk of disease is an acceptable element of a standard 
for medical monitoring claims. Indeed, one commentator has noted that toxicogenomic 
data “could help many plaintiffs trigger recovery, by demonstrating both an existing ‘in-
jury’ and a sufficient increase in risk” and that the field “has the potential to greatly ex-
pand the number of potential medical monitoring claims.” Marchant, supra note 39, at 
332. 
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quately address the issues in toxic tort litigation.”59 Consequently, courts 
have recognized novel claims in the toxic tort setting to address prob-
lems encountered by victims of toxic exposure.60 
B.Novel Theories in Toxic Torts to Address Shortcomings 
 Three distinct theories of tort recovery have emerged as a solution 
to some of the difficulties faced by victims of toxic torts.61 In the 1980s, 
courts began to accept claims for increased risk of illness, fear of dis-
ease or emotional distress, and medical monitoring resulting from toxic 
torts.62 All three of these claims depart from traditional notions of ac-
tionable harms and what the common law of tort has required to show 
injury.63 
1. Enhanced Risk of Illness 
 Claims for enhanced risk do not involve any type of present physi-
cal injury, and plaintiffs seek damages based on the fact that exposure 
has significantly increased their risk of developing a serious disease.64 
While some courts may accept that enhanced risk of illness is an in-
jury,65 the enhanced risk theory is the least accepted of the three novel 
theories advanced by toxic tort victims because there is no common law 
basis for such a recovery.66 One explanation for why the common law 
does not treat enhanced risk as a physical harm is that the duty of care 
is generally to avoid causing the ultimate harm, and not a duty to avoid 
engaging in conduct that will increase risk of causing the ultimate 
harm.67 For courts that permit such claims, plaintiffs have had difficulty 
                                                                                                                      
59 Czmus, supra note 3, at 35. 
60 Ann Taylor, Comment, Public Health Funds: The Next Step in the Evolution of Tort Law, 
21 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 753, 754 (1994). However, some have argued that even these 
novel claims are inadequate to compensate victims of toxic torts. See Pizzirusso, supra note 
1, at 206. 
61 Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 197. 
62 Id. 
63 See Keeton et al., supra note 24, § 30, at 165 (stating that “[t]he threat of future 
harm, not yet realized, is not enough” in a negligence action); Taylor, supra note 60, at 754. 
64 Richard Bourne, Medical Monitoring Without Physical Injury: The Least Justice Can Do for 
Those Industry Has Terrorized with Poisonous Products, 58 SMU L. Rev. 251, 254 (2005). 
65 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 304–05 (N.J. 1987) (stating that enhanced 
risk of illness is “clearly an ‘injury’ under the [Tort Claims] Act”). 
66 See Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 200, 202 (stating that increased risk claims are less ac-
cepted than claims for emotional distress and that medical monitoring claims are the most 
accepted by the courts). 
67 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 1652. 
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succeeding because courts will often require plaintiffs to prove, using 
expert testimony, that they are more likely than not to develop the ill-
ness—a standard that is very difficult to meet.68 
2. Emotional Distress 
 Emotional distress, or “fear of,” claims in the toxic tort context al-
lege a present injury in the form of mental anguish from the fear of 
developing a disease as a consequence of exposure to a toxic sub-
stance.69 Claims for fear of developing a disease have been more ac-
cepted by courts than enhanced risk claims because emotional distress 
claims are based upon traditional common law doctrines.70 Many courts 
require plaintiffs bringing emotional distress claims to show an accom-
panying physical injury or prove an actual increase in the risk of devel-
oping a disease.71 This helps courts to distinguish between legitimate 
and false claims.72 Some courts have ruled that some sort of physical or 
subcellular changes, which are not traditional physical injuries them-
selves, may be sufficient to support a claim for emotional distress.73 
3. Medical Monitoring 
 While medical monitoring claims involve enhanced risk, the claim 
itself does not seek damages to remedy that risk.74 The claim is that the 
present injury is the need to undergo costly medical diagnostic tests 
that a medical doctor has deemed to be advisable or necessary as a re-
sult of wrongful exposure to some toxic substance caused by the defen-
dant.75 The remedy for such a claim is money damages equivalent to 
                                                                                                                      
68 Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 201. 
69 Bourne, supra note 64, at 254; Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 198. 
70 Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 198–200. 
71 Id. at 199. 
72 Id. 
73 E.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226–27 (D. Mass. 1986) (de-
clining to grant summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs’ harm is subcellular and 
therefore does not meet the injury requirement for emotional distress claims); see, e.g., In 
re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 303, 314–15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (finding that testimony regarding subcellular changes to plaintiffs’ DNA raises a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether there is sufficient injury for a claim of emo-
tional distress); Bryson v. Pillsbury Co., 573 N.W.2d 718, 720–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) 
(finding that the question of whether subcellular changes in the form of chromosome 
damage constitutes a present injury is an issue for the trier of fact). 
74 Bourne, supra note 64, at 254. 
75 Id.; Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 203. 
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the cost of medical monitoring.76 Medical monitoring is generally de-
fined by medical professionals as “a form of surveillance based on re-
petitive use of the same test . . . to detect a specified change in the pa-
tient indicating a . . . need for treatment or a change in his 
treatment.”77 The plaintiff usually does not have to quantify any specific 
level of enhanced risk or even show that a future illness is likely to oc-
cur.78 The exact elements of a medical monitoring claim vary by juris-
diction.79 Claims for medical monitoring are often brought as class ac-
tions following a mass exposure.80 
II. Medical Monitoring 
 Courts in different jurisdictions have reached opposite conclusions 
in cases involving medical monitoring claims without a present physical 
injury.81 In 1984, the D.C. Circuit was the first court to allow a claim for 
medical monitoring absent physical injury in Friends for All Children, Inc. 
v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.82 The New Jersey Supreme Court soon followed 
suit and allowed plaintiffs to recover medical monitoring costs in Ayers 
v. Township of Jackson.83 As more jurisdictions addressed the validity of 
medical monitoring claims absent a showing of a present physical in-
jury, there was a general trend to follow the Ayers court.84 California, 
Pennsylvania, and Utah were among the states to recognize medical 
monitoring claims absent proof of physical injury.85 Then, in 1997, the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue for the first time in 
Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, and rejected a claim for 
medical monitoring without physical injury under the Federal Employ-
                                                                                                                      
76 Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 203. 
77 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 Mo. 
L. Rev. 349, 351 (2005). Note that some commentators have argued that courts and medi-
cal professionals have differing views on medical monitoring programs. See infra Part II.A. 
78 Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 309 (N.J. 1987) (rejecting Appellate Divi-
sion’s conclusion that a claim for medical monitoring is dependent on the risk of injury 
being quantified and probable); Czmus, supra note 3, at 36. 
79 See Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring: War-
ranted or Wasteful?, 20 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 121, 125 (1995). 
80 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 1703. 
81 Herbert L. Zarov et al., A Medical Monitoring Claim for Asymptomatic Plaintiffs: Should 
Illinois Take the Plunge?, 12 DePaul J. Health Care L. 1, 1–2 (2009). 
82 See 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Zarov et al., supra note 81, at 3. 
83 See 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987); see also infra notes 144–148 and accompanying text. 
84 See Zarov et al., supra note 81, at 7 (noting that the trend of allowing medical moni-
toring claims in the absence of a present physical injury shifted in 1997). 
85 Id. at 5–7. 
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ers’ Liability Act.86 Thereafter, a number of states, including Michigan, 
Oregon, and Nevada, rejected medical monitoring claims absent proof 
of physical injury.87 However, there has not been a completely uniform 
trend in one direction, as various jurisdictions have reached opposite 
conclusions pre- and post-Buckley, and some jurisdictions have yet to 
consider the issue.88 Thus, the law surrounding such claims is currently 
unsettled.89 While the issue has principally been considered by courts, 
one state legislature—Louisiana—enacted legislation banning recovery 
of medical monitoring damages absent physical harm.90 
A. Legal Arguments Against Medical Monitoring Claims 
 Opponents of using medical monitoring as a cause of action argue 
that tort law appropriately requires a present physical injury, and allow-
ing such claims would unfairly expand tort liability.91 Traditional com-
mon law does not allow for recovery for future harms or purely eco-
                                                                                                                      
86 521 U.S. 424, 438–44 (1997). Although the case was brought under a federal statute 
and not common law, it is cited because, for the purposes of this Note, it is generally anal-
ogous to medical monitoring claims brought in the toxic tort setting. 
87 Zarov et al., supra note 81, at 9. 
88 Aberson, supra note 7, at 1114–17 (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia as the jurisdictions allowing medical monitoring 
claims absent physical injury; Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, 
Virginia, and Washington as the states not allowing medical monitoring claims in the ab-
sence of a physical injury; and Arkansas, Maryland, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Alaska, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming as states that either have not addressed medical monitoring or have not articu-
lated a test). This list was current as of 2006. See id. However, Massachusetts now belongs in 
either the first category or second category, depending on whether one views subcellular 
changes as a present physical injury. See Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 
891, 901–02 (Mass. 2009). Oregon now belongs in the second category. See Lowe v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 186–87 (Or. 2008). 
89 Zarov et al., supra note 81, at 2. 
90 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (Supp. 2010) (stating “[d]amages do not include costs 
for future medical treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures of any kind unless such 
treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures are directly related to a manifest physical 
or mental injury or disease”). 
91 See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442 (stating that plaintiffs bringing claims for medical moni-
toring absent physical harm would detract judicial resources from plaintiffs with present 
physical injuries who are more deserving); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 690–
91 (Mich. 2005) (stating that the present physical injury requirement “serves a number of 
important ends for the legal system”); Zarov et al., supra note 81, at 21–29 (arguing that 
allowing medical monitoring claims absent physical injury has negative consequences for 
plaintiffs, the judicial system, and society overall). 
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nomic harms absent a present physical injury, and there are important 
legal and policy justifications for this requirement.92 Allowing medical 
monitoring claims without a showing of physical harm causes courts to 
speculate about the extent to which a plaintiff has a cognizable legal 
claim and makes it difficult for courts to exclude frivolous suits.93 Re-
quiring a present physical injury also sets a clear standard for courts to 
follow when deciding which plaintiffs have a valid claim.94 Further, such 
a requirement restrains courts from deciding questions more appropri-
ate for a legislative body, such as the amount of exposure required to 
state a claim, the type of medical evidence needed to support such a 
claim, and whether exposure to one chemical is more deserving of 
medical monitoring than another.95 Indeed, the common law in many 
states refuses to recognize stand-alone emotional harms and purely 
economic damages for these same reasons.96 Medical monitoring costs 
can quickly rise into the million dollar range,97 and since plaintiffs do 
not have to show that a future illness is likely, it is possible that many 
may never develop a disease.98 Critics argue that while deterrence and 
ensuring public health are important considerations, medical monitor-
ing claims brought in courts are not the appropriate way to deal with 
the issue, which should instead be left to legislatures to resolve.99 
1. The Supreme Court Denies Medical Monitoring Claims Absent 
Physical Injury: Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley 
 In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff 
could not bring a claim for medical monitoring without physical injury 
                                                                                                                      
92 See Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 689–92 (stating that Michigan common law does not rec-
ognize claims for future injury or purely economic loss and enumerating purposes of a 
present physical injury requirement). 
93 Id. at 690–91. 
94 Id. 
95 Schwartz et al., supra note 77, at 377–78 (arguing that “courts are not fit to answer 
all the questions arising with the implementation of a medical monitoring system” and that 
“[s]tate legislatures are better-suited to undertake this analysis than the courts”). 
96 See Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 690–91; Pizzirusso, supra note 1, at 199 (stating that many 
courts recognizing fear of cancer or emotional distress claims require an actual present 
injury). 
97 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 297–98 (N.J. 1987) (disagreeing with Appel-
late Division’s decision to set aside jury verdict of $8,204,500 for medical monitoring costs). 
98 See Czmus, supra note 3, at 36 (stating that many courts that allow medical monitor-
ing claims do not force plaintiffs to show that a future illness is likely to occur). 
99 See Martin & Martin, supra note 79, at 121; Schwartz et al., supra note 77, at 374 
(“Medical monitoring, if instituted as a cause of action at all, should be instituted by state 
legislatures, not the courts.”). 
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under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.100 The plaintiff in Buckley 
alleged that he was negligently exposed to asbestos, and sued to recover 
the cost of future medical checkups.101 In denying the plaintiff’s claim 
because he could not show physical harm or symptoms of any disease, 
the Court reasoned that it is difficult to determine which medical mon-
itoring costs are the result of toxic exposure, as opposed to routine 
medical monitoring.102 The Court added that there is usually uncer-
tainty among medical professionals as to which tests are truly necessary 
and when they should be administered.103 Furthermore, the Court rec-
ognized that modern-day living results in chemical exposure in varying 
degrees for millions of individuals.104 Allowing medical monitoring 
claims absent physical harm, the Court predicted, could cause a 
“‘flood’ of less important cases” that would detract judicial and medical 
resources from more deserving plaintiffs with present injuries.105 The 
Court also noted that large recoveries in some cases would unnecessar-
ily award plaintiffs who have alternative forms of payment, such as in-
surance, available to them.106 
2. Michigan Follows Suit: Henry v. Dow Chemical Co. 
 In 2005, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that plaintiffs could 
not state a claim for medical monitoring absent physical harm in Henry 
v. Dow Chemical Co.107 Plaintiffs claimed that defendant had negligently 
exposed them to high levels of a known carcinogen and should pay for 
plaintiffs’ medical monitoring costs.108 The court began its analysis by 
determining the exact nature of the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring 
claim, and then deciding whether it was cognizable under Michigan 
law.109 First, the court considered that plaintiffs were alleging damages 
in anticipation of future injury and decided that Michigan law does not 
recognize claims for future injury.110 Alternatively, the court considered 
that plaintiffs’ claim was that their present injury is the additional ex-
pense of medical monitoring and concluded that this claim also fails 
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because Michigan tort law does not recognize financial losses as “inju-
ries.”111 In rejecting this view of plaintiffs’ claims, the court made an 
important distinction between damages and injury.112 The court noted 
that plaintiffs demonstrated economic losses that would be considered 
damages, but that these losses are not themselves considered an in-
jury.113 The court reasoned that while financial damages in the form of 
medical monitoring costs may be awarded to plaintiffs who had estab-
lished a present physical injury, these expenses are not compensable in 
the absence of a present physical injury and do not substitute for an 
actual, present injury.114 Finally, the court reasoned that the only other 
way to characterize plaintiffs’ claim is that they have alleged a fear of 
future physical injury, and concluded that a claim characterized in this 
manner would also fail because Michigan common law only recognizes 
claims for emotional distress when accompanied with “physical manifes-
tations of that distress.”115 
3. Oregon Also Holds No Medical Monitoring Without Physical Harm: 
Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
 In 2008, the Supreme Court of Oregon followed Michigan by rul-
ing that a claim for medical monitoring absent physical harm does not 
state a claim for negligence in Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.116 Plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants’ negligent manufacture and sale of cigarettes 
caused plaintiffs to be at a significantly increased risk of developing lung 
cancer and that, because of defendants’ negligence, it was reasonable 
and necessary for plaintiffs to undergo medical monitoring tests.117 The 
court observed that Oregon has repeatedly declined to impose liability 
for negligence when a plaintiff has suffered purely economic loss and 
no accompanying injury to person or property.118 The court concluded 
by noting that although other jurisdictions have allowed medical moni-
toring, Oregon precedent controls the issue and declined to modify the 
state’s common law.119 
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4. Questioning the Benefits of Medical Monitoring 
 Some commentators have argued that the scientific community’s 
approach to medical monitoring is inconsistent with the views of courts 
that allow medical monitoring without requiring evidence of present 
physical injury.120 According to the medical community, medical moni-
toring programs are only appropriate when they have the potential to 
prevent or cure a disease.121 Therefore, a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis should precede every medical monitoring program.122 
 Other critics assert that many courts that allow medical monitoring 
claims overstate the beneficial effects of diagnostic testing.123 These crit-
ics argue that many medical monitoring programs are ineffective and 
fail to detect diseases early in asymptomatic patients.124 Additionally, 
they argue that some medical monitoring programs frequently result in 
false positives125 or false negatives,126 and the consequences of each 
should be accounted for as risks of undergoing medical monitoring.127 
 Finally, critics note that early detection of some diseases may fail to 
improve a patient’s health, and in such cases, the risks of medical moni-
toring outweigh any potential benefits.128 These critics argue that courts 
are not in a position to decide which diseases need medical monitor-
ing, nor are they in a position to decide what criteria should be used to 
determine whether medical monitoring is appropriate in a specific 
case.129 Critics argue that because courts lack the expertise to address 
the issues involved in medical monitoring, and because allowing such 
                                                                                                                      
120 Schwartz et al., supra note 77, at 362 (“[M]edical monitoring is only appropriate 
where it can be expected to be effective and where its benefits outweigh its costs. A basic 
objective ‘predictor’ for this result is some contemporary injury or harm. In contrast, 
[some] courts have ignored this medical and scientific guidance and have instead imple-
mented full-scale medical monitoring awards where the plaintiffs have no present physical 
injury.”); Zarov et al., supra note 81, at 29 (stating that the medical community has reached 
a different conclusion than courts with respect to the benefits of medical monitoring). 
121 Schwartz et al., supra note 77, at 350–51. 
122 Id. at 349. 
123 Zarov et al., supra note 81, at 29–34. 
124 Id. at 30–31 (citing the failure of medical monitoring to detect nephrotoxicity re-
sulting from lead exposure before observable symptoms). 
125 A test result indicating disease when the patient has none. Id. at 31. 
126 A test result indicating that the patient is healthy when the patient has a disease. Id. 
at 32. 
127 See id. at 31–32. 
128 Id. at 33–34. 
129 Schwartz et al., supra note 77, at 377–78. 
2011] Subcellular Changes & Medical Monitoring Claims 109 
 
claims departs significantly from traditional tort law, if such claims are 
to be permitted, a legislature should be the responsible body.130 
B. Legal Arguments Supporting Medical Monitoring Claims 
 Supporters of medical monitoring claims absent physical injury 
argue that these claims are consistent with tort principles because they 
only require the defendant to pay for medical costs that would other-
wise have been unnecessary but for the defendant’s culpable con-
duct.131 These supporters believe that it is consistent with tort principles 
to shift the burden of medical monitoring costs from the party that has 
been wrongfully exposed to toxic chemicals to the party that was re-
sponsible for that wrongful exposure.132 
 Courts that support medical monitoring claims have cited four 
policy considerations.133 First, courts have recognized the public health 
interest in facilitating access to medical testing when it enables early 
diagnosis and treatment.134 Second, awarding medical monitoring costs 
deters the irresponsible behavior of discharging toxins.135 Third, award-
ing medical monitoring costs has the effect of reducing overall costs by 
preventing or mitigating future illnesses.136 Finally, there is an inherent 
unfairness in forcing innocent victims of wrongful exposure to pay for 
medical monitoring expenses when it would be reasonable to shift that 
burden to the party responsible for the wrongful exposure.137 
 The first court to allow a medical monitoring claim absent physical 
harm was the D.C. Circuit Court in Friends for All Children, Inc., v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp.138 The case involved an action brought by survivors of 
a plane crash who had to undergo medical testing for a possible neuro-
logical disorder.139 In affirming the district court’s order that the de-
fendant fund the diagnostic tests, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the 
ruling would serve the purposes of tort law by deterring wrongful con-
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duct and compensating victims of wrongdoing.140 The court considered 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of injury, which defines it as 
“the invasion of any legally protected interest of another.”141 The court 
reasoned that an interest in avoiding expensive medical tests is similar 
to the interest in avoiding a physical injury, and that the defendant 
clearly invaded this interest with its negligent conduct.142 Since the de-
fendant’s actions proximately caused the need for diagnostic testing, 
the court was satisfied with imposing liability on the defendant for the 
cost of the diagnostic examinations.143 
 In Ayers v. Township of Jackson, the New Jersey Supreme Court also 
allowed a claim for medical monitoring absent physical harm in a case 
involving plaintiffs who were exposed to toxic pollutants as a result of 
defendant’s negligent operation of a landfill.144 The court was per-
suaded by both policy and legal considerations.145 The court noted that 
recognizing pre-symptom claims for medical monitoring allows tort law 
to operate in a way so as to deter polluters, while mitigating serious fu-
ture illnesses and thereby reducing overall costs to both parties.146 
Moreover, the court reasoned, it is inequitable to force a wrongfully 
exposed individual to pay for his own medical costs when medical 
monitoring is necessary.147 The court concluded by holding that medi-
cal monitoring claims can be supported without physical harm where 
the plaintiff proves 
through reliable expert testimony predicated upon the sig-
nificance and extent of exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of 
the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for which indi-
viduals are at risk, the relative increase in the chance of onset 
of disease in those exposed, and the value of early diagnosis, 
that such surveillance to monitor the effect of exposure to 
toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary.148 
 The court in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation followed Ayers, 
and held that Pennsylvania law recognizes a claim for medical monitor-
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ing absent physical injury.149 The court defined a claim for medical 
monitoring as seeking “to recover only the quantifiable costs of peri-
odic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical 
harm,” and defined the injury in these claims as “the cost of the medi-
cal care that will, one hopes, detect that injury.”150 The court then out-
lined four factors to prove a claim for medical monitoring: (1) signifi-
cant exposure to a proven hazardous substance because of defendant’s 
negligence; (2) increased risk of developing disease as a proximate re-
sult of exposure; (3) increased risk, which makes medical monitoring 
necessary; and (4) procedures exist to make early detection and treat-
ment beneficial.151 
 In a more recent case, Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia applied a similar test in find-
ing medical monitoring claims absent physical harm cognizable.152 The 
court stated that a plaintiff must prove that: 
(1) he or she has . . . been significantly exposed; (2) to a 
proven hazardous substance; (3) through the tortious con-
duct of the defendant; (4) as a proximate result of the expo-
sure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of contracting a 
serious latent disease; (5) the increased risk of disease makes 
it reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to undergo periodic 
diagnostic medical examinations different from what would 
be prescribed in the absence of the exposure; and (6) moni-
toring procedures exist that make the early detection of a dis-
ease possible.153 
C. The Massachusetts Approach: the Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.Test 
 In October 2009, Massachusetts considered the issue and allowed 
medical monitoring, but formulated a standard that deviated from oth-
er states that have allowed the claim in the absence of present physical 
injury.154 In Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., the Supreme Judicial 
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Court of Massachusetts (SJC) held that a cigarette manufacturer may 
have to pay for the medical monitoring costs of smokers who have not 
yet developed lung cancer.155 The United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts had certified the questions regarding state law 
to the SJC.156 The plaintiffs were a class of Marlboro cigarette smokers 
who were at least fifty years old and had smoked the equivalent of twen-
ty pack-years157 of cigarettes.158 Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged 
that Philip Morris negligently designed their cigarettes, and therefore 
Philip Morris should pay for medical tests for early detection of lung 
cancer.159 The tests cost approximately $400 to $500 per year.160 Plain-
tiffs contended that Marlboro cigarettes contain “an excessive and un-
reasonably dangerous quantity of carcinogens,” and that Philip Morris 
had feasible alternative designs for cigarettes containing a lower 
amount of carcinogens.161 
 Over the objections of the defendant, the court reasoned that sub-
cellular or physiological changes that are not, in themselves, symptoms 
of any illness or disease, but are warning signs of a substantial increase 
in risk of contracting a disease, satisfy the element of injury in a tort 
action.162 Recognizing that the plaintiffs’ harm would arguably not have 
satisfied the injury requirement in traditional tort actions, Justice Spina 
wrote, “[w]e must adapt to the growing recognition that exposure to 
toxic substances and radiation may cause substantial injury which 
should be compensable even if the full effects are not immediately ap-
parent.”163 The court clarified that as long as there is a subcellular or 
physiological change, and a substantial increase in risk of harm, plain-
tiffs do not need to allege any specific level of increased risk to state a 
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claim for medical monitoring.164 Finally, the court explicitly outlined 
the elements that a plaintiff must prove in order to state a claim for 
medical monitoring: 
(1) The defendant’s negligence (2) caused (3) the plaintiff to 
become exposed to a hazardous substance that produced, at 
least, subcellular changes that substantially increased the risk 
of serious disease, illness, or injury (4) for which an effective 
medical test for reliable early detection exists, (5) and early 
detection, combined with prompt and effective treatment, will 
significantly decrease the risk of death or the severity of the 
disease, illness or injury, and (6) such diagnostic medical ex-
aminations are reasonably (and periodically) necessary, con-
formably with the standard of care, and (7) the present value 
of the reasonable cost of such tests and care, as of the date of 
the filing of the complaint.165 
The court implied that this test strikes an appropriate balance by ad-
dressing concerns over false claims and permitting legitimately injured 
parties to recover costs of medical monitoring “without having to over-
come insurmountable problems of proof.”166 
 The court in Donovan recognized that not all claims for medical 
monitoring in toxic tort cases will involve physiological or subcellular 
changes.167 Therefore, Justice Spina wrote, “[w]e leave for another day 
consideration of cases that involve exposure to levels of chemicals or 
radiation known to cause cancer, for which immediate medical monitor-
ing may be medically necessary although no symptoms or subclinical 
changes have occurred.”168 In one of the only cases that has discussed 
Donovan at any length, the Superior Court of Rhode Island granted the 
defendant’s motion to prohibit testimony regarding medical monitoring 
because the plaintiff had failed to present any physiological changes 
and, therefore, medical monitoring damages would be inappropriate.169 
The court emphasized that Donovan was limited to cases involving phys-
iological changes.170 
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 While the SJC is the latest court to recognize a claim for medical 
monitoring absent physical harm, it is not the first to explicitly define 
what type of evidence is necessary to establish exposure.171 The SJC is 
also not the first to recognize the value of cellular changes as beneficial 
scientific evidence.172 In 1994, a commentator argued that while “courts 
would prefer to have easily documentable scientific evidence regarding 
plaintiffs’ cellular changes, the availability of such scientific evidence is 
unlikely.”173 
 Reactions to the Donovan case have been varied, with some claim-
ing that the decision increases potential liability of tobacco companies 
greatly, and others saying that toxic tort law in Massachusetts has not 
changed much.174 While tens of thousands of people could qualify as 
plaintiffs and be awarded medical monitoring if the class action against 
Philip Morris is successful, many of those may have health plans that 
pay for the diagnostic tests.175 
III. Donovan as a Model for Medical Monitoring Claims 
 The case law and the arguments outlined above exemplify the le-
gal debate over whether claims for medical monitoring absent physical 
injury—as traditionally defined—should be allowed. On the one hand, 
the traditional requirement that plaintiffs establish some present physi-
cal harm is justifiable because, in the absence of such a requirement, 
courts would be forced to speculate about the extent of injury and to 
engage in arbitrary line-drawing.176 Allowing such claims would greatly 
expand tort liability and unnecessarily burden the courts by assigning 
them the precarious responsibility of deciding which instances of expo-
sure are worthy of medical monitoring claims—a responsibility better 
left to legislatures.177 On the other hand, plaintiffs should be allowed to 
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recover medical costs incurred solely as a result of defendants’ negli-
gence, because it is unfair to force innocent victims to pay for their own 
medical tests.178 
 The Donovan court set an appropriate standard for courts to apply 
in assessing claims for medical monitoring, by requiring a plaintiff 
bringing a medical monitoring claim to show at least subcellular or 
physiological changes.179 The court recognized that the injury require-
ment in tort law is satisfied by showing medically observable changes 
that, while not symptoms of disease, establish exposure and a corre-
sponding increased risk of disease.180 Legal and policy justifications de-
fend this standard.181 
A. The Present Physical Injury in Medical Monitoring Claims: Exposure to a 
Toxic Substance that Has Caused at Least Subcellular Changes 
 Courts that have rejected medical monitoring claims have framed 
them as either claims for stand-alone emotional distress, stand-alone 
economic harm, or as alleging damages in anticipation of future in-
jury.182 These courts have then rejected the claims on the basis that 
state common law does not recognize these novel theories in the ab-
sence of some traditionally defined physical injury.183 The courts can 
justify following their states’ traditional common law doctrines by argu-
ing that there is generally no duty to avoid causing an increased risk of 
harm.184 Furthermore, the physical injury requirement is necessary to 
help distinguish between legitimate and false claims.185 
 Medical monitoring claims are best framed as requesting relief for 
the present injury of medical testing as a result of subcellular changes 
that necessitate medical monitoring.186 The subcellular component of 
the injury should be viewed as the “physical” harm.187 Such a construc-
tion of injury is not a radical departure from tort law; some courts have 
already stated that the injury requirement is satisfied by showing subcel-
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lular changes in claims for emotional distress.188 Claims for medical 
monitoring only seek reimbursement for medical expenses incurred as 
a result of the defendant’s negligence.189 These medical expenses are 
required because of toxic exposure.190 Subcellular or physiological 
changes indicating an increased risk of harm can establish toxic expo-
sure.191 Therefore, subcellular physiological changes are sufficient to 
satisfy the present physical injury requirement in a claim for medical 
monitoring.192 Indeed, by their very nature, claims for medical monitor-
ing will not involve present physical harm as traditionally conceptualized 
because the whole aim of medical monitoring is to detect the onset of 
physical harm.193 Hence, the “physical injury” in medical monitoring 
claims is appropriately viewed as subcellular changes requiring medical 
monitoring.194 However, recognizing that subcellular changes satisfy the 
present physical injury requirement and framing the claim in this man-
ner is only the first step in analyzing medical monitoring claims.195 After 
addressing the injury requirement, the Donovan court articulated a fair 
standard to apply to medical monitoring claims.196 
B. The Donovan Court Articulated the Best Standard for  
Medical Monitoring Claims 
 The court in Donovan framed the medical monitoring claim as 
damages for medical expenses that were incurred as a result of the de-
fendant’s negligence.197 This construction of medical monitoring claims 
incorporates an understanding of “injury” that recognizes a present 
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physical injury in the absence of symptoms of a known disease.198 Thus, 
the Donovan Court did not follow other courts that set forth a similar 
standard for medical monitoring in concluding that no present physical 
injury was required.199 After preliminarily recognizing that the injury 
requirement is satisfied if a medical monitoring claim demonstrates 
subcellular or physiological changes that indicate a need for medical 
testing, the court set forth a fair standard that plaintiffs must meet in 
order to recover damages.200 The first part of the test requires that the 
defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s exposure.201 This aspect of 
the test satisfies the basic requirement of tort law that the plaintiff must 
prove the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff and caused the 
plaintiff harm.202 
 The second part of the test addresses the injury requirement and 
requires that the exposure “produced, at least, subcellular changes that 
substantially increased the risk of serious disease, illness, or injury.”203 
The test further requires that an effective medical test for early detec-
tion exists, and that early detection and treatment will significantly de-
crease the risk of death or severity of disease.204 Like other courts that 
have allowed medical monitoring, Donovan also requires that the diag-
nostic exams be reasonably necessary.205 According to this standard, 
“increased risk of future disease” is a necessary component of the rea-
sonably necessary standard, because if the subcellular changes did not 
result in an increased risk of future disease, medical monitoring would 
not be reasonably necessary.206 Therefore, the Donovan court appropri-
ately reasoned that no particular quantification of the increase in risk is 
required—only that the increased risk be significant.207 
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1. Establishing at Least Subcellular Change is a Necessary Component 
of Medical Monitoring Claims 
 A significant difference between other courts that allowed medical 
monitoring claims and Donovan is the Donovan Court required the plain-
tiffs show that the exposure produced at least subcellular changes.208 
This assertion recognizes that showing a present physical harm should be 
necessary in medical monitoring claims.209 Requiring at least subcellular 
changes addresses a central and practical concern of those courts that do 
not allow medical monitoring claims; it provides a basis for holding that 
the present physical injury requirement has been satisfied.210 For exam-
ple, the Oregon Supreme Court in Lowe faced a complaint almost identi-
cal to the one presented before the Massachusetts SJC.211 In Lowe, if 
smokers had alleged at least subcellular changes—along with establish-
ing the other elements of the Donovan test—they would have stated a val-
id claim for medical monitoring under the Massachusetts approach.212 
 The usefulness of subcellular or physiological changes in deter-
mining toxic exposure has also been discussed by legal commentators 
who note the implications of increasingly sophisticated scientific meth-
odology.213 An example of the usefulness of examining subcellular 
changes is found in the field of toxicogenomics.214 While toxicoge-
nomic data may one day be used in toxic tort cases to prove that physio-
logical changes indicate exposure to specific toxic substances, today 
competent medical testimony can be used to at least establish measur-
able subcellular changes, which indicate an increase in risk of disease 
that necessitates medical monitoring.215 
2. The Donovan Standard for Medical Monitoring Claims Does Not 
Unfairly Exclude Deserving Plaintiffs 
 The Donovan standard is carefully balanced: it is sufficiently broad 
so that it does not unfairly exclude potential deserving plaintiffs, but 
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rejects potentially frivolous claims.216 Notably, this standard leaves out 
those plaintiffs who claim to have been exposed to a toxic substance but 
cannot show a corresponding subcellular or physiological change.217 
The Donovan standard requires subcellular or physiological changes be-
cause, in the context of medical monitoring claims, this requirement 
appropriately replaces the role of the traditional physical harm re-
quirement.218 The present physical harm requirement is critical because 
it allows courts to distinguish between legitimate and frivolous claims.219 
Furthermore, the requirement sets a clear standard for courts to follow 
and restrains courts from having to speculate about the extent of the 
injury.220 As the United States Supreme Court noted in Buckley, the reali-
ties of modern day living necessarily expose millions of people to vari-
ous chemicals in varying degrees.221 Without some showing of present 
physical harm, millions of people could bring claims merely alleging 
exposure and increased risk, leaving courts without any justifiable stan-
dard to distinguish between deserving and non-deserving plaintiffs.222 
Thus, it is not unfair to exclude plaintiffs who are unable to establish 
subcellular changes because, in the context of medical monitoring 
claims, the requirement is analogous to the traditional injury require-
ment required in all tort actions.223 
 The standard also leaves out plaintiffs who cannot prove that med-
ical testing would be effective in their case.224 Therefore, if a plaintiff 
alleges that toxic exposure caused subcellular changes that resulted in 
an increased risk of disease X, and medical monitoring for disease X 
either does not exist or would not be effective, then the plaintiff cannot 
proceed with a claim for medical monitoring.225 This is a fair result be-
cause, in the absence of an effective remedy, the current injury is one 
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that would not be redressable.226 Indeed, other courts that have allowed 
medical monitoring claims have imposed similar restrictions.227 
 Subcellular changes indicating an increased risk of disease do not 
state a valid claim for medical monitoring if the plaintiff cannot estab-
lish that medical testing is necessary and would be effective.228 Likewise, 
mere exposure and increased risk of harm without any accompanying 
physiological indicators should not be considered a legally cognizable 
harm.229 Perhaps one day, toxicogenomic studies will have progressed 
enough to be used to definitively establish causation in toxic exposure 
cases.230 The Donovan test is flexible and fully consistent with any medi-
cal advances that could potentially detect subcellular or physiological 
changes upon exposure to toxic substances.231 Indeed, medical advances 
that improve the detection of subcellular or physiological changes that 
occur as a result of exposure would fairly increase the applicability of 
the Donovan test to plaintiffs with medical monitoring claims.232 
3. The Donovan Standard for Medical Monitoring Claims Is Not Unfair 
to Defendants 
 The Donovan standard is sufficiently narrow so that it is not unfair 
to potential defendants.233 The Donovan standard severely limits the 
number of plaintiffs who can state a valid claim for medical monitoring 
damages.234 With this standard, plaintiffs who merely allege exposure 
without being able to show the presence of any toxin or physical 
change in their bodies will not be able to pursue a claim for medical 
monitoring.235 In requiring that plaintiffs establish some sort of physio-
logical or subcellular change, the Donovan standard addresses concerns 
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of false claims cited by courts that reject medical monitoring claims.236 
The standard allows a court to view subcellular changes as a threshold 
that solves the line-drawing problems that some courts identify when 
rejecting medical monitoring claims.237 One critique of medical moni-
toring claims absent physical harm, cited by the Buckley Court, was the 
prediction of a flood of litigation from plaintiffs who have been ex-
posed to varying degrees of chemicals.238 It is unclear whether the Buck-
ley Court would accept subcellular changes as meeting the criteria of 
physical injury; nevertheless, the requirement limits the “‘flood’ of . . . 
cases” to plaintiffs who can demonstrate physiological change.239 
 The standard further limits the potential pool of plaintiffs by re-
quiring that effective medical tests for the relevant disease exist, that 
early detection would be useful and effective, and that such tests are 
reasonably necessary.240 Therefore, courts would disallow a medical 
monitoring claim if plaintiffs cannot show that medical monitoring 
would be effective or if doctors conclude that the risks of medical mon-
itoring outweigh the benefits.241 This standard addresses critics’ con-
cerns about the differing viewpoints of the courts and the scientific 
community regarding medical monitoring because it requires plaintiffs 
to show that medical monitoring is acceptable—and reasonably neces-
sary—as determined by the medical community.242 
 The courts that have not allowed medical monitoring claims have 
also cited the potentially enormous costs of medical monitoring claims 
that would be imposed on defendants.243 A standard that limits the po-
tential pool of plaintiffs would also limit the potential cost to the de-
fendant.244 Furthermore, the potential cost to defendants could be mit-
igated if plaintiffs’ health insurance covers the cost of the medical 
tests.245 
 Finally, it is important to emphasize that in order to recover medi-
cal monitoring costs, plaintiffs have to prove that they were exposed as 
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a result of defendants’ negligence.246 It is fair to require negligent de-
fendants to pay for medical costs incurred as a result of their negli-
gence.247 Indeed, courts have cited the inherent unfairness in forcing 
innocent victims of wrongful exposure to pay for their medical ex-
penses as a policy reason for allowing medical monitoring claims.248 
Conclusion 
 Victims of toxic exposure often have difficulty in establishing cau-
sation and injury in tort claims.249 Medical monitoring is a novel claim 
for recovery in the toxic tort setting.250 A medical monitoring claim is 
for reimbursement of medical diagnostic testing that plaintiffs needed 
as a result of wrongful exposure to a toxic substance.251 Courts have 
been split on whether medical monitoring claims are cognizable in the 
absence of present physical harm.252 In 2009, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts set forth the best standard for addressing medi-
cal monitoring claims.253 
 The court allowed plaintiffs that could prove at least subcellular 
changes to proceed with a claim for medical monitoring, even if no 
symptoms of any disease were present.254 In doing so, the court held 
that the injury requirement is met in a medical monitoring claim when 
medically observable changes establish exposure and a corresponding 
increase in risk of disease.255 Although not within the field of tradition-
ally recognized injuries, subcellular or physiological changes as a result 
of toxic exposure that necessitate medical monitoring are appropriately 
viewed as an injury.256 
 This standard is better for plaintiffs who cannot show objective 
symptoms of any disease because it modifies the traditional physical 
harm requirement in the context of medical monitoring claims.257 
While it leaves out plaintiffs who cannot show at least some physiologi-
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cal change, this is a fair result because it sets a clear standard for courts 
to follow and fulfills the functions of the traditional injury requirement 
in torts.258 The Donovan test is fair to defendants because it greatly lim-
its the pool of potential plaintiffs that can bring medical monitoring 
claims.259 Furthermore, the standard requires that plaintiffs prove that 
defendants were negligent.260 The subcellular change requirement ad-
dresses concerns of false claims and further limits the pool of plaintiffs 
by requiring that early detection be useful for the particular disease 
which the plaintiffs are at an increased risk of developing.261 
 Therefore, in the absence of legislative action, courts should adjudi-
cate medical monitoring claims according to the Donovan standard.262 
Perhaps medical advances in the near future will solve some of the causa-
tion difficulties inherent in toxic torts; but for now, the Donovan standard 
best balances the rights of plaintiffs and defendants, and grants at least 
the costs of medical monitoring to plaintiffs with subcellular changes.263 
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